Reaffirming the Legal Distinction Between False Promise and Breach of Promise to Marry
Introduction
In Jaspal Singh Kaural v. The State of NCT of Delhi (2025 INSC 457), the Supreme Court revisited the legal principles related to rape allegations arising from promises to marry.
The case is significant as it deals with consensual, long-term relationships where one partner later claims that sexual consent was given based on a marriage promise.
The Supreme Court used this case to clearly distinguish between a genuine promise that was later broken and a false promise made solely to obtain sexual consent through deception.
The ruling helps clarify the legal boundary between breach of trust and criminal misconduct in such intimate relationships.
Mr. Jaspal Singh Kaural, the appellant, challenged a Delhi High Court verdict that had reversed his prior discharge from charges under Sections 376 (rape) and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the Indian Penal Code.
Upon reviewing the facts and evidence, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment.
The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s original order of discharge.
This effectively ended the criminal case against the appellant.
This commentary examines the judgment’s core findings and its implications, especially concerning how Section 376 IPC is to be interpreted in “promise to marry” cases.
Case Summary
The key issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in revoking the trial court’s discharge of the appellant under Sections 376 and 506 IPC. The complainant alleged that she entered into a sexual relationship with the appellant, believing his assurance that he would marry her after both of them divorced their respective spouses. Once the relationship deteriorated, she filed an FIR alleging rape and criminal intimidation.
After examining the evidence, the trial court determined that the complainant had willingly and consciously participated in the relationship. The Court found no evidence suggesting that the appellant’s promise to marry was made with fraudulent intent or a motive to mislead. Consequently, it discharged him of the charges. However, the High Court later overturned this discharge, stating there was enough prima facie material to proceed with the charges. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court, which restored the trial court’s original ruling.
In its final ruling, the Supreme Court clarified that simply failing to fulfill a promise to marry does not, by itself, constitute rape. The key consideration is whether the promise was made with dishonest intent from the outset or was initially genuine but could not be honored due to subsequent developments.
3. Legal Analysis
3.1 Precedents Considered
The Court relied significantly on earlier judgments that differentiate between intentional deception and a sincere but unsuccessful promise.
A key precedent was Naim Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023), where the Court clarified that a broken promise to marry does not automatically constitute rape.
It emphasized that only a promise made with the intent to deceive—aimed solely at securing sexual consent—can amount to rape under the law.
In the Naim Ahmed case, the woman was involved in an extended romantic relationship with the accused despite being married during that period.
The Court found that her decision to enter the relationship was made with full understanding, and her consent could not be considered as obtained through misrepresentation.
Similar reasoning was followed in Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra and Prashant v. State of NCT Delhi, where courts reaffirmed that a consensual relationship turning sour does not in itself justify prosecution under Section 376 IPC unless there was evidence of fraud at inception.
3.2 Judicial Reasoning
The Supreme Court underscored that courts must assess the complainant’s mental state at the time consent was given. If the promise to marry was never genuine and made solely to obtain consent for sexual activity, it would amount to “consent under misconception of fact,” thus qualifying as rape under Section 375 IPC.
In this case, however, several factors led the Court to conclude otherwise:
- Absence of Deceptive Intent: The evidence did not indicate any deliberate intent on the part of the appellant to deceive. On the contrary, his actions showed that he had, at some point, intended to honor his promise.
- Prolonged Consensual Relationship: The complainant and appellant had known each other since 2011 and rekindled their connection in 2016. Their relationship, which included sexual intimacy, lasted several years despite both being in other marriages.
- No Criminal Intimidation Found: The charge under Section 506 IPC was dismissed due to lack of credible evidence showing that the complainant was subjected to threats or coercion.
3.3 Broader Implications
The judgment carries significant weight for future cases involving similar allegations:
- Clarification of Consent: It reinforces that consent, when given with full understanding and without coercion, cannot later be labeled as non-consensual purely based on the subsequent failure of a promise.
- Evaluating Intent at the Outset: Courts must carefully examine whether there was deceptive intent at the time the promise was made, rather than basing decisions solely on later developments.
- Revisional Powers of High Courts: The ruling also reasserts that High Courts should not overturn discharge orders lightly and must respect the trial court’s assessment unless there is clear perversity or legal error.
Simplifying Legal Concepts
A key legal question in this case revolves around the concept of “consent obtained under a misconception of fact,” outlined in Section 375 of the IPC. Consent given based on a promise that the promisor knowingly intends to be false is considered invalid. However, to establish this, it must be proven that the promise was made with a deliberate intention to deceive right from the start.
The Court also referenced Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which empowers the Sessions Court to discharge an accused if the records show that there isn’t enough evidence to proceed. At this early stage, courts are not expected to evaluate the full merits of the case but only to decide if the allegations make out a legal case.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Jaspal Singh Kaural v. The State of NCT of Delhi draws a much-needed line between two different legal situations—false promise and breach of promise. It confirms that not every failed relationship or unfulfilled promise of marriage should be prosecuted as rape. Unless there is clear proof that the promise to marry was made dishonestly and solely to obtain consent, no criminal liability under Section 376 IPC arises.
This ruling ensures a more balanced legal framework: it protects individuals who are genuinely misled while also preventing the misuse of rape laws in the context of consensual adult relationships. The decision is likely to influence how future courts view “promise to marry” allegations, especially when such cases stem from long-term relationships between consenting adults.
By providing clarity and legal precision, the judgment promotes fairness and prevents the dilution of serious criminal provisions through their application in private relationship disputes that do not involve deception or coercion.
Frequently Asked questions:
What is the main issue addressed in the Jaspal Singh Kaural case?
The central issue was whether an unfulfilled promise to marry can constitute rape under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court examined whether the promise was made deceitfully to obtain consent for sexual relations.
What does the Supreme Court say about “false promise to marry” and rape?
The Court clarified that a false promise — one made with no intention of being fulfilled, purely to obtain sexual consent — may amount to rape. But a genuine promise that later remains unfulfilled due to changed circumstances is not a criminal offence.
